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Abstract: Ernst Mayr is a well-known biologist and philosopher in the twentieth 
century. Being a biologist, he is an important person in constructing the synthesis 
theory of evolution; being a philosopher, he has advocated a new philosophy, which, 
he claims, synthesizes the achievement of different biologies and physics, while at 
the same time getting rid of the influences of the traditional philosophy of science. In 
this essay, I will systematically investigate the main principles and the basic scheme 
of his new philosophy. I find that Mayr’s new ideas of philosophy of biology can be 
summarized as the following five statements: The physical science is not the standard 
paradigm of the whole science; The historical narratives are more important than the 
explanation of laws; The explanation and the prediction are asymmetrical in life 
science; Concepts are more essential than laws in biology; There is no conflict 
between causality and teleonomy. 
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1. Introduction 
As we know, philosophy of science must be rooted in the soil of science, including physical science 
and biological science. It is regretful, however, that the philosophy of science before the middle of 
twentieth century was almost entirely based on physical science. Early in the middle of nineteenth 
century, Darwin had already said that the development of biology would bring philosophy into 
prosperity, but either the positivism of the time or the logical positivism arising in the beginning of 
twentieth-century borrowed almost no ideas from biology. It seemed that for a long time biological 
thought had not made any influences on philosophy. From the middle of the twentieth century, 
because of the revolution of the molecular biology and the new syntheses of the evolutionary theory, 
things began to change. More and more philosophers began to pay attentions to biological ways of 
thinking, and developed new ideas based on biology. From then on, philosophy of biology became a 
hot discussion area in the philosophy of science. Theses and works began to spring up. 
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Among these thinkers, American biologist and philosopher Ernst Mayr is a leading figure. His new 
philosophy of biology and philosophy of science become influential theories. As we already known, 
being a biologist, he is an important person in constructing the synthesis theory of evolution; being a 
philosopher, he has advocated a new philosophy, which, he claims, synthesizes the achievement of 
different biologies and physics, while at the same time getting rid of the influences of the traditional 
philosophy of science. What kind of influences does biological science bring into philosophy? What 
does biological science provide for contemporary philosophy? What is the main scheme of Mayr’s 
new philosophy? From his first philosophical paper (1961) to his last book What Makes Biology 
Unique? (2004) Mayr had tried to answer these questions. This paper will explore the core ideas of 
his new philosophy of biology. 
 
2. Physical science is not the standard paradigm of science 
According to Mayr, physical science represented by the classical mechanics first grew after the 
modern scientific revolution. At that time, however, biology was still in the stage of germination. 
And it had not developed until the middle of nineteenth century. Consequently, the ideas and 
methods of physical science naturally became the yardstick of all science. Most philosophers 
naturally saw physical science as the norm of science. They thought that once we understand physics, 
we understand any other sciences. This tradition continues to influence philosophy today. Mayr 
refers to this regretfully: “Since the scientific revolution, the philosophy of science has been 
characterized by an almost exclusive reliance on logic, mathematics, and the laws of physics (Mayr 
1988, v).” He also says that all the works claimed being “philosophy of science” actually deal only 
with physical science (Mayr 1982, 33). It seems that there is no lively organic world; it seems that 
the theoretical achievements made by biologists do not have any influence on human philosophical 
thought. Therefore, Mayr points out, we must establish a new philosophy. The first task of this new 
philosophy is to get rid of the influences of physicalism. 
 
How do we get rid of this influence? Mayr suggests that we first should change our traditional 
beliefs about the unity of science, and properly emphasize the plurality of science, namely that we 
should notice that physical science and biological science are not the same science. People often 
believe that Newton and physical law are co-extensive with science, but early before seventh century 
there were several other traditions of science that virtually had nothing to do with Newtonian 
mechanics (Mayr 1982: 33). For instance, natural history was just a tradition that was quite different 
from Newtonian tradition. Later, “Physiology lost its position as the exclusive paradigm of biology 
in 1859 when Darwin established evolutionary biology. When behavioral biology, ecology, 
population biology, and other branches of modern biology developed, it became even more evident 
that how unsuitable mechanics was as the paradigm of biological science (Mayr 1988: 12).”  
 
Advocating the autonomy of biology and opposing the unity beliefs of the physicalism, one must 
refute the theoretical foundation of the physicalism: reductionism. Physicalists believe that the 
autonomy of the biological science is only superficial. In principle, all biological theories can be 
reduced to physical theories. But according to Mayr, reduction leads to no result and is nonsensical 
method. For at different level of the biological hierarchical system, there will emerge new properties. 
Though both the higher levels and lower level of the hierarchical system are composed of atoms and 
molecules, the processes on higher level are often independent of the processes of lower levels. 
Mayr therefore points out, there are different problems at different levels, and we should raise 
different theories at each level. In this way, each level will lead to independent biological branch, 
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from macromolecular level to organelle, cell, organ and others: at molecular level is molecular 
biology, cellular level is cytology and tissue level is organism biology, etc. Thus, in order to 
interpret life phenomena sufficiently, we must do research on every level. 
  
Of course, when criticizing physicalism, Mayr does not completely abandon the belief of the unity 
of science. He says: “When confronted by mythology or religion, science offers a unified front. All 
sciences, in spite of manifold differences, have in common that they are devoted to the endeavor to 
understand the world. Science wants to explain, it wants to generalize, and it wants to determine the 
causation of things, events and processes. To that extent, at least, there is a unity of science (Mayr 
1982: 32).” But such unity has nothing to do with the reductive unity of physicalism. When 
criticizing the unity view of physicalism, biologist Simpson raises a completely different view. He 
says: “Biology, then, is the science that stands at the center of all science … And it is here, in the 
field where all the principles of all sciences are embodied, that science can truly become unified (see 
Mayr 1982: 35).” After citing Simpson’s words, Mayr points out, we might not agree with all 
Simpson’s viewpoint, but we could see Simpson clearly showing to us the ongoing direction of the 
unity of science. He says: “I believe that a unification of science is indeed possible if we are willing 
to expand the concept of science to include the basic principles and concepts of not only the physical 
but also the biological science. Such a new philosophy of science will need to adopt a greatly 
enlarged vocabulary----one that includes such words as biopopulation, teleonomy, and program. It 
will have to abandon its loyalty to a rigid essentialism and determinism in favor of a broader 
recognition of stochastic processes, a pluralism of causes and effects, the hierarchical organization 
of much of nature, the emergence of unanticipated properties at higher hierarchical levels, the 
internal cohesion of complex system, and many other concepts absent from----or at least neglected 
by----the classical philosophy of science (Mayr 1988: 21).”  
 
3. The historical narratives are more important than explanations of laws 
According to traditional philosophy of science, the basic form of scientific explanation is to cover 
the needing explanatory events under a law or laws. What is law? From epistemological point of 
view, law is a kind of statement as follows: (1) it contains a universal determiner, not referring to 
any specific time, place and individual; (2) it has empirical content and obtained confirmation; (3) it 
is subordinate to a more general theory, and thus has theoretical assurance. The first requirement is 
criterion of “universality”, the second is “verifiability”, and the third is “coherence”. Physicalists 
believe that any branch of science that deserves to be a real science must have a series of such laws. 
 
In term of such requirements, J. J. C. Smart claimed that only physics and chemistry have universal 
laws; biological science has no laws (see Mayr 1982). Well-known philosopher Karl Popper also 
believed that there are no laws in biology (see Mayr 1982). Popper thought that because the 
evolution of life on the Earth and the evolution of human society are unique historical processes, the 
descriptions of evolution are not laws, but only single historical statements. Popper therefore 
claimed that finding the “invariable order” and “laws” of evolution is impossible. Some 
philosophers even began to doubt the scientific status of evolution. 
   
Mayr also believes that there are no laws in biology, but he does not deny the scientific status of 
evolutionary theory. Instead, he suggests that we should change our traditional ideas about science. 
Mayr holds that the so-called biological laws people often talk about are not universal, because they 
all have exceptions. He says there is only one universal law in biology: “all biological laws have 
exceptions (Mayr 1982, 38).” Mayr thinks that because the events biology tries to describe are 
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historically unique, the biological generalization is probabilistic. Every life form is related to history, 
and therefore it has unique features. This means that the explanation of life phenomena is not the 
same as that in physical science. As a matter of fact, Mayr thinks that the ideas of laws are the 
inevitable result of the false view of essentialism.  
 
Essentialism was developed by Plato and had dominated the thinking of west philosophical thought 
from then on. According to essentialists, the variable phenomena world is the reflection of the 
invariant essences. These essences are what is real and important in this world. The variation of the 
real world is only the imperfect manifestation of the underlying essences. Invariability and 
discontinuity are especially emphasized by the essentialists. Mayr suggested that such kinds of ideas 
must be replaced by the new ideas of population thinking. Opposite to essentialism, population 
thinking believes that the important thing is not essence, but individual. Many biological phenomena, 
especially population phenomena are characterized by extremely high variances. Rates of evolution 
or rates of speciation may differ from each other by three to five orders of magnitude, a degree of 
variability rarely if ever recorded for physical phenomena. Entities in the physical world have 
constant characteristics, while biological entities are characterized by their changeability. Such kind 
of specificity in biological entities tells us that we must use a new kind of thinking for investigating 
biological phenomena which is completely different from the thinking for investigating entirely 
homogeneous lifeless things. What does this new thinking looks like? According to Mayr, traditional 
thinking emphasizes invariance and essence, whereas the new thinking emphasizes uniqueness and 
history. Therefore Mayr claims, the new philosophy of biology “should not focus most of its 
attention on laws, considering what small roll laws actually play in much of biological theories 
(Mayr 1982: 76).”  
 
If laws are not important in the explanation in biology, then how does the biological explanation 
proceed? Mayr thinks, the more important explanation in biology is the historical narratives. He says: 
“it might have been evident soon after 1859 that the concept of law is far less helpful in evolutionary 
biology (and for that matter in any science dealing with time-dominated processes such as 
cosmology, meteorology, paleontology, or oceanography) than the concept of historical narratives.” 
(Mayr 1982: 130) T. A. Goudge once said: “narrative explanations enter into evolutionary theory at 
points where singular events of major importance for the history of life are being discussed ... 
Narrative explanations are constructed without mentioning any general laws ... Whenever a narrative 
explanation of an event in evolution is called for, the event is not an instance of a kind [class], but is 
a singular occurrence, something which has happened just once and which can not recur [in the same 
way] ... Historical explanations form an essential part of evolutionary theory(from Mayr 1982: 71)”. 
Mayr agrees with this idea. According to Mayr, historical narratives have explanatory value because 
earlier events in a historical sequence usually make a causal contribution to later events .Thus one of 
the objects of historical narrative is to discover causes responsible for ensuing events. However, he 
states, “philosophers trained in the axioms of essentialistic logic seem to have great difficulty in 
understanding the peculiar nature of uniqueness and of historical sequences of events. Their attempts 
to deny the importance of historical narratives or to axiomatize them in terms of covering laws fail 
to convince(Mayr 1982: 72).” Therefore Mayr concludes: “The so-called laws of biology are not the 
universal laws of classical physics but are simply high-level generalizations.” He continues, as 
Kitcher has stated: “there are a number of sciences that proceed extraordinarily well without 
employing any statements which can uncontroversially be called laws (Mayr 1988: 19).” 
 
4. Explanation and prediction in biology are asymmetrical 
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According to the physicalists’ model of explanation, i.e., the “deductive-nomological theory” (or 
covering-law model), explanation and prediction are symmetrical. Such a model can be 
diagrammatically represented as follows:  
 
 
  (1) L1 ·L2 ·L3 …… Ln    Explanatory statement 
(2) C1·C2·C3……Ck 
      
(3) E                 Explanatory object 
 
Where, L1 · L2 · L3 …… Ln are law-like universal statements, C1 · C2 · C3 …… Ck is particular 
statement concerning about the initial or premise conditions, E is deductive result, and also is the 
object to be explained. That is to say, if E is known and E can be deduced from (1) and (2), then E is 
explained. Otherwise, if (1) and (2) is known, and (3) can be deduced from (1) and (2), then (3) is a 
predictive result. This implies that the explanation and prediction in physical science are 
symmetrical. Thus, if a scientific theory can make good prediction, its explanatory value is also high; 
on the other hand, if its explanatory value is high, then it can make good predictions. 
 
Mayr believes, such parlance does not fit biology. He states: “the theory of natural selection can 
describe and explain phenomena with considerable precision, but it cannot make reliable predictions, 
except through such trivial and meaningless circular statements as, for instance: ‘The fitter 
individuals will on the average leave more offspring’” He continues for supporting Scriven’s idea: 
“one of the most important contributions to philosophy made by the evolutionary theory is that it has 
demonstrated the independence of explanation and prediction (Mayr 1988, 31-32).”  
 
Of course, Mayr holds that the asymmetry of explanation and prediction does not exclude that there 
are also predictions in biology. Biologists will be very happy if their causal explanations 
simultaneously have high predictive value. There are many kinds of predictions in biology, such as 
prediction in classification, prediction of physicochemical phenomena on molecular level, prediction 
of the outcome of complex ecological interactions and prediction of evolutionary events, etc., but 
nearly all of these predictions are statistical. The reasons for the statistical characteristics of 
biological predictions are as follows: (1) biological events are always randomness, and many 
processes are indeterminate; (2) biological entities are unique, and there are no laws for these unique 
entities; (3) biological entities are extremely complex, and this complexity makes us quite difficult 
to describe them completely; (4) emergence of new qualities at higher levels of integration makes it 
impossible to predict just from the properties of the components. Mayr thus points out that though 
predictive ability in physical science is the touchstone of the goodness of a causal explanation, in 
biology it is not a prerequisite of a good biological theory (Mayr 1988: 33-35). 
 
5. Concepts in biology are more essential than laws 
If laws in biology are not important, as Mayr emphasizes time after time, then how does biology 
develop its theories? Mayr claims that though biology does not, like physics, raise laws to develop 
its theory, biologists often organize their generalizations into a framework of concepts. One might 
say that law versus concept is only a formal difference, since every concept can be translated into 
one or several laws. But Mayr thinks that even if this were formally true, such a translation would 
not be helpful in the actual performance of biological research. Why not? Mayr thinks, “laws lack 
the flexibility and heuristic usefulness of concepts (Mayr 1982: 43).” Since biologists always 
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generalize their conclusions into conceptual framework, the progress in biological science is largely 
a matter of the development of these concepts or principles. Though the discovery of new fact is also 
an important symbol of scientific progress, in evolutionary biology, major progress is made by 
introducing new concepts or improvement of existing concepts. As he says, “our understanding of 
the world is achieved more effectively by conceptual improvements than by the discovery of new 
facts, even though the two are not mutually exclusive (Mayr 1982: 23).” For instance, plant breeders 
had already discovered the ratios of 3:1 many times before Mendel. Even Darwin had obtained a 
number of such ratios in his plant-breeding work. Nevertheless, all this was meaningless until 
Mendel introduced the appropriate concepts and until Weismann introduced additional concept that 
made Mendelian segregation more meaningful. This is much truer for evolutionary biology and 
systematics than for functional biology. Mayr points out, one can easily take almost any advance in 
these areas and show that it did not depend as much on discoveries as on the introduction of 
improved concepts. Mayr thus says: “the contributions made by new concepts or by the more or less 
radical transformation of old concepts is equally and often more important than facts and their 
discovery(Mayr, 1982: 24).” Why do the improvement of concepts and the posing of new concepts 
advance biology? The reason Mayr gives is that these concepts can help to clarify a previously 
confusing area of biology and can lead to new theory formation and countless new investigations. 
For instance, many phenomena now explained by natural selection were widely known long before 
Darwin, but the explanations to these phenomena at that time were very confused. Until concepts 
like evolution, common descent, geographic speciation, isolating mechanism, and natural selection 
were introduced into biology, the primary confusion situation obtained reoriented, and the natural 
selection theory gained strong explanation power. Meanwhile, a lot of biologists were brought into 
the area of research of evolutionary theory (Mayr 1982: 24). 
   
How do we improve the biological concepts? According to biological development, Mayr raises 
several kinds of methods for improving concepts: (1) eliminating invalid theories and concepts; (2) 
eliminating inconsistencies and contradictions; (3) importing from other fields; (4) eliminating 
semantic confusions; (5) eclectically fusing competing theories (Mayr 1982: 840-843).  
  
In a word, Mayr thinks, “progress in the biological sciences is characterized not so much by 
individual discoveries, no matter how important, or by proposal of new theories, but rather by the 
gradual but decisive development of new concepts and the abandonment of those that had previously 
been dominant (Mayr 1982: 856).”  
 
I think Mayr does a good work to emphasize the important role of concepts in the development of 
biology. But this is right for all sciences. Concept change is a feature of the development of any 
science. It isn’t peculiar to biology.  
 
6. There is no conflict between causality and teleonomy 
When talking about the relations between biology and other science, Mayr advocates that we should 
properly emphasize the plurality of sciences. He believes that the physicalists’ views of the unity of 
science are false and that biology is an autonomous science. Likewise, when talking about the 
characteristics of biological science itself, Mayr thinks that biology itself also is not a homogeneous, 
unified discipline. Rather, it is a heterogeneous, diverse subject. For biology can be divided into the 
study of proximate causes, the subject of physiological or functional biology, and into the study of 
ultimate causes, the subject of natural history or evolutionary biology. 
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Mayr points out, functional biologists are vitally concerned with operation and interaction of 
structural elements, from molecules up to organs and whole individuals. His ever-repeated question 
is “how?” How does something operate? How does it function? On the contrary, evolutionary 
biologists are vitally concerned with why an organism is the way it is. Their basic question is 
“Why?” 
 
It is evident that the causations functional biology and evolutionary biology are concerned with are 
remarkably different. Functional biologists are concerned with “proximate cause”, whereas 
evolutionary biologists are concerned with “ultimate cause” or “evolutionary cause”. Proximate 
causes relate to the functions of an organism and its parts as well as its development, from 
morphology to biochemistry, whereas ultimate causes, evolutionary causes or historical causes 
attempt to explain why an organism is the way it looks like. We may ask: why do organisms have 
two different causes? Mayr’s answer is: organisms have a genetic program. Proximate causes are 
concerned with decoding the genetic program of a given individual, whereas evolutionary causes are 
concerned with changes in the genetic program through time and the reasons for these changes. 
 
Mayr holds that physical science only investigates proximate causes, for “why” questions in the 
sense of “for what” are meaningless for lifeless objects. We can ask: “why the Sun is hot?” But this 
is only in the sense of “how to occur”. In contrast, “why” questions in life sciences have great 
methodological value. The question “why are there valves in vein?” conduced Harvey finding blood 
circulation. For these reasons, Mayr holds that we can raise questions about the meaning of 
biological processes through two ways: First, to ask the functions of the biological structures; second, 
to ask the origin and developmental reasons of biological processes. Thus evolutionary biologists 
must often raise “why” questions if they want to know the reasons for biological evolutions. 
 
Since we often ask “why” questions in biology, Mayr thus suggests that we must rethink the 
teleological problems. As we know, Aristotle was the first person who systematically brought up 
teleological thought. He thought that the teleological cause is an important reason for the 
development and changes of things. From the beginning of modern science, Galileo, Bacon and 
Descartes strongly criticized Aristotle’s teleological thought. However, Harvey established blood 
circulation theory by asking what the purpose of the activity of the heart is (i.e. “why” question), 
nearly at the same time Galileo claimed that the major aim of scientific research was to solve “how” 
questions rather than “why” questions. Thereafter, there had been a debate between extreme 
mechanism and extreme vitalism in biology. With the development of biology, more and more 
biologists found that teleological explanation widely existed in biology. It is under this circumstance 
that Mayr also aggressively justifies the rationality of teleological explanation that exists in biology. 
To begin with, he analyses traditionally how people misconstrue Aristotle, regarding him as a 
cosmic teleologist. Mayr thinks that this is completely wrong. He points out, Aristotle actually was 
first and foremost a biologist, and “it was his preoccupation with biological phenomena which 
dominated his ideas on causes and induced him to postulate final causes in addition to the material, 
formal, and efficient causes (Mayr 1988: 29).” What is the essence of teleological causes or final 
causes?  Biologist Delbruck once said that if we employ modern terms like genetic program for 
eidos, then we can relevantly understand Aristotle’s original idea. Mayr thinks that such opinion is 
quite true. He claims that Aristotle’s eidos is totally different form Plato’s eidos: “Aristotle saw with 
extraordinary clarity that it made no more sense to describe a house as a pile of bricks and mortar. 
Just as the blueprint used by the builder determines the form of a house, so does the eidos (in 
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Aristotelian definition) give the form to the developing organism, and this eidos reflects the terminal 
telos of full-grown individual (Mayr 1988: 56).” 
 
Of course, Mayr knows that Aristotle was unable to know what indeed eidos is, but modern science 
reveals that it is “genetic program.” Mayr believes that all teleonomical processes in biological 
world actually are programmed processes. Thus Mayr claims that “the existence of telonomic 
programs ... is one of the most profound differences between the living and the inanimate world, and 
it is Aristotle who first postulated such a causation (Mayr 1988: 57).”  
 
In conclusion, Mayr holds that “the use of so-called teleological language by biologists is legitimate 
(Mayr 1988: 59);” “Teleonomic (that is, programmed) behavior occurs only in organisms (and man-
made machines) and constitutes a clear-cut difference between the levels of complexity in living and 
in inanimate nature (Mayr 1988: 60);” “the heuristic value of teleological Fragestellung makes it a 
powerful tool in biological analysis (Mayr 1988: 60).” Of course, Mayr does not deny that there are 
false conclusions in Aristotle’s teleology, but he thinks that “Aristotle’s error was not that he used 
teleological explanations in biology, but that he extended the concept of teleology to the nonliving 
world (Mayr 1988: 56).”  
 
7. Conclusion: toward a new philosophy 
In his tremendous amount of papers and works, Mayr also refers many other philosophical theses, 
such as, the questions about the ontological status of species, the problem of the unit of natural 
selection, biology and human value, etc., but his main philosophical principles are as we discussed 
above.  
 
In his famous book The Growth of Biological Thought, Mayr summarizes his main ideas as follows: 
(Mayr 1982, 75-76) 
“(1) That a full understanding of organisms cannot be secured through the theories of physics 
and chemistry alone. 
“(2) that the historical nature of organism must be fully considered, in particular their possession 
of an historically acquired genetic program; 
“(3) that individuals at most hierarchical levels, from the cell up, are unique and form 
populations, the variance of which is one of their major characteristics; 
“(4) that there are two biologies, functional biology, which asks proximate questions, and 
evolutionary biology, which asks ultimate questions; 
“(5) that the history of biology has been dominated by the establishment of concepts and by 
their maturation, modification, and—occasionally—their rejection; 
“(6) that the patterned complexity of living systems is hierarchically organized and that higher 
levels in the hierarchy are characterized by the emergence of novelties; 
“(7) that observation and comparison are methods in biological research that are fully as 
scientific and heuristic as the experiment; 
“(8) that an insistence on the autonomy of biology does not mean an endorsement of vitalism, 
orthogenesis, or any other theory that is in conflict with the laws of chemistry or physics.” 
 
From these, we can conclude that the main goal of Mayr’s new philosophy is to emphasize the 
autonomy of biological science. Actually he is one of the founders of the autonomism (versus 
provincialism) of philosophy of biology. Being a biologist who has done research on the macro-
biological problems for decades, Mayr deeply realizes that biology, especially evolutionary biology 
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has a unique research tradition and conceptual framework. Thus he strongly opposes physicalism, 
essentialism and reductionism. In the process of summarizing the characteristics and ways of 
thinking of biology, Mayr raises many new ideas with independent thinking, and there are no lacks 
of profound insights. He himself already said in his The Growth of Biological Science, “biologists 
like Rensch, Waddington, Simpson, Bertalanffy, Ayala, Mayr, and Ghiselin have made a far greater 
contribution to a philosophy of biology than the whole older generation of philosophers, including 
Casirer, Popper, Russell, Bloch, Bunge, Hempel, and Nagel (Mayr 1982: 75).” Indeed, Mayr’s 
contribution to philosophy of biology is enormous, and he also is creditably one of the greatest 
thinkers of philosophy and biology. But we should also aware that his thought is only one school of 
contemporary philosophy of biology. Some of his arguments still need to be developed and some of 
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